Ближний Восток и его соседи

g 57 h A Russian Post-Imperial Policy Paper on the Imperial Political Logic Concerning... the British Raj 14 . That explains Russia’s refusal to include an Afghan repre- sentative into the Anglo-Russian Demarcation Committee as an equal member and its restriction of his role to an advisory capacity only 15 . The Political Section focuses on the issues associated with the Russian pacification of nomadic Turkmen tribes of Saryk and Salur ( salar in Russian) that often resorted to attacks on their Iranian, Afghan and Bukharan neighbours due to the low production nature of their economy. As these tribes were in dire need of lands the Afghan annexation of the Panjdeh oasis would have deprived them of livelihood and unsettle the entire Central Asian balance 16 . Here Vve- denskiy occupies a high moral ground demonstrating imperial benevolence towards deprived tribal subjects, yet he fails to articulate the instrumentaliza- tion of such an attitude for the advancement of a larger imperial agenda — that of a consolidation of the Russian rule over the newly acquired territories. Characteristically, he similarly fails to notice an analogous British approach in their attempts to secure Afghan interests. However, he accuses Great Britain of inciting chaos in the Turkmen lands and establishing a Central Asian coalition of Muslim principalities hostile towards Russian advancement in Central Asia. Such a coalition should pivot on Iranian-Afghan reconciliation, Bukharan- Afghan rapprochement and as a secondary factor the lawlessness in the Turk- men lands 17 . How would Bukhara that was apprehensive of the Turkmen raids on its territory benefit from the latter remains unclear. Unfortunately, Vve- denskiy does not provide any proof of such an assertion and perhaps mirrors the British scaremongering of the Russian threat for British India. That often unsubstantiated alarmism displayed by both sides fuelled the Anglo-Russian rivalry in the region known as the Great Game. Vvedenskiy continues with the description of Bukharan economic interests in neighbouringAfghan Balkh andMeymene and Iranian attempts to win Herat. While explaining both countries’ policies in totally rational terms Vvedenskiy presents the British position as overwhelmingly pro-Afghan and ultimately aiming at the above-mentioned anti-Russian coalition building 18 . Of notice is his complete disregard of internal Afghan dynamics and exclusive emphasis on foreign policy factors resulting from the alleged British support of Afghan ambitions. 14 For more details on the British support of the Afghan northward territorial expansion see Lee J. The “Ancient Supremacy”: Bukhara, Afghanistan and the Battle for Balkh, 1731–1901. Leiden — New York — Köln: E. J. Brill, 1996. 15 Vvedenskiy. P. 11 16 Vvedenskiy. P. 54–55. 17 Vvedenskiy. P. 58–59. 18 Vvedenskiy. P. 60–61.