Ближний Восток и его соседи

g 85 h The Odyssey of the Andalusian Conquerors of Crete... A careful scrutiny of the Arabic and Byzantine sources explains why the Andalusian fleet had no encounters with the all-powerful Byzantine provincial fleet. 107 No doubt the Andalusians were given enough time to carefully plan every aspect of their journey, considering even the proper spring wind and the routes of their previous attacks against the Byzantine islands. Both Byzantine and Arabic sources report that the Andalusians had already undertaken some earlier incursions against the Byzantine islands before their final departure to Crete and plausibly, as it has already been said, they had even raided Crete on their way to Alexandria. 108 Moreover, the Andalusians, assisted by the Egyp- tians who actually encouraged them to go to Crete, 109 must have made every effort using their naval intelligence to be informed about the situation that pre- vailed in the Aegean Sea at the time of their expulsion. 110 The Arabic sources report that the Andalusians were well aware that “the sea was empty at the time of their expulsion”. 111 Not a single Byzantine warship sailed in the time of their expedition. Complementing the informa- tion of the Arabic sources, the Byzantine sources explicitly state that this was caused by the turbulent situation created by Thomas’ rebellion (821–823) which crippled the Byzantine thematic fleet and created a vacuum in the Byz- antines’ defense that lasted far beyond the actual time of the uprising. 112 It is the 107 Theophanes Continuatus, Chronography , 75. 108 Genesius, Regum libri quattuor , ed. A. Lesmüller-Werner and H. Thurn, Berlin — New York 1978, 32; al-Maqrīzi, Khiṭaṭ , I , 322. 109 Sa ‘īd, Mughrib , I, 42. 110 For naval espionage see Christides, “Two Parallel Naval Guides of the Tenth Century: Qudāma’s Document and Leo VI’s Naumachica. AStudy on Byzantine and MoslemNaval Preparedness”, Grae- co-Arabica 1 (1982), 89–91(article: 51–103); idem “Military Intelligence in Arabo-Byzantine Na- val Warfare”, in Byzantium at War (9 th -12 th c.), The National Hellenic Research Foundation, Athens 1997, 269–281; idem, “Underwater Archaeology and History. The Case of Serçe Limani”, in Mari- time Studies in the Wake of the Byzantine Shipwreck at Yassiada , Turkey , ed. by Deborah N. Carlson, J. Leidwanger, and Sarah M. Kampbell, College Station TX 2015, 168 (article: 167–173). 111 Ibn al-Abbār, Kitāb al-Ḥulla al-Siyarā’, ed. H. Mu’nis, I, Cairo 1963, 45. 112 Christides, The Conquest of Crete by the Arabs (ca. 824), 86- 87. A bleak picture, showing Thomas on a warship fleeing from Constantinople to the Arabs, depicts a multitude of Byzantines of various classes accompanying him; see Christides, “The Cycle of the Arab-Byzantine Struggle in Crete (ca 824/6–961AD) in the Illuminated Manuscript of Skylitzes”, 23, fig. 3. It should be not- ed that just before the revolution of Thomas, the Byzantines had started the establishment of forti- fications and the organization of the southern part of their thematic fleet; see the relevant reference in the excellent article by Maria Leontsini, based on the archaeological and numismatic evidence, “Τα Κύθηρα και αι νήσοι επτά πελοποννήσιοι λεγόμεναι στο «Περί Θεμάτων» του Κωνσταντίνου Ζ´ Πορφυρόγεννητου (913–959)”, in Ιστορίας μέριμνα , Τιμητικός τόμος στον καθηγητή Γεώργιο Ν. Λεοντσίνη, Αthens 2011, 699–700 (article: 697–711). Following the Arab conquest of Crete, an ambivalent line of a sea Arab-Byzantine frontier in southern Aegean prevailed, extending mainly around Monemvasia and the island of Cythera; see Christides, “The Maritime Arab-Byzantine